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Abstract
We study the impact of income redistribution on the decisions of a
health care innovator and the utility of individuals. We Þnd that income
redistribution from rich to poor can increase the quality of medical inno-
vation and the utility of some consumers whose income is reduced through
the redistribution. We therefore Þnd a non-altruistic motive for a income
transfers that would increase access to health innovations.
JEL ClassiÞcation: D4, L1, I1.
Keywords: Health Care; Pharmaceuticals; Innovation; Income Distrib-
ution
1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on how to ensure the Third World access to innova-
tions in the health care. The pharmaceutical companies are criticized for selling
the state of the art drugs at prices well above production costs, which the devel-
oping countries often cannot aord to pay. The drug companies, on the other
hand, argue that the prospect of high proÞts is a necessary incentive to develop
new drugs. Fears of price arbitrage, due to the so called grey re-importing,
constrain opportunities for price discrimination between high and low income
countries. Indeed, it would be in the innovators best interest to price discrim-
inate if feasible. But the pharmaceutical companies general reluctance to link
individual country prices to the countrys income is the best proof that poten-
tial price arbitrage (either through parallel trade or external price referencing)
is considered a threat to eective price discrimination.
WCorresponding author. Tel.: 0044 (0)1227827488; fax: 0044 (0)1227827850. E-mail ad-
dress: m.c.garcia-alonso@kent.ac.uk.
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It has been suggested that the rich-world taxpayers should bear the cost
of ensuring Third World access to pharmaceutical innovations (The Econo-
mist, February 2001). In April 2001, the UN launched the Global Fund to
Þght AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, a public-private partnership to raise
funds and improve access to the health care resources necessary to combat
the most deadly diseases of poverty. As of September 2003, more than $3
billion have been pledged to the Fund by governments and private donors
(www.theglobalfundatm.org). The Fund supports the purchase of commodi-
ties, including pharmaceuticals, used in the prevention and treatment of the
above mentioned diseases.
The success of such cash transfers requires, however, that the richer nations
are willing to participate. This, in turn, depends on the strength of altruism
and on the degree of conÞdence that the donations will be used e!ciently or
will indeed reach intended beneÞciaries.
In this paper we identify a purely self-interested motive behind income trans-
fers to poorer nations. Increased purchasing power in poorer countries may
change the Þrms optimal pricing and quality of innovations. In this paper, we
examine such eects. SpeciÞcally, we study the impact of cash transfers from
the richer to the poorer countries on the equilibrium values of the quality of
innovation, its price and the market coverage. Also, we identify the impact of
transfers on the utility of consumers, paying special attention to those who make
the transfers. This allows us to measure the potential support for a system of
income transfers among the countries.
The characterization we use follows the existing literature on the vertical dif-
ferentiation with income disparities across consumers (Gabszewicz and Thisse,
1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1982). However, unlike most of the vertical dierenti-
ation models, we are not concerned with the strategic interaction between Þrms
but with the strategic interactions between a unique innovative Þrm, which faces
a competitive fringe in the established quality, and an international organiza-
tion that seeks the support of its members to use income transfers as a tool for
increasing access to health care innovation. We view the decision to participate
in the international transfer system as a three stage game, in which Þrst, the
donors and the recipients commit to an income transfer system; second, the
Þrms choose the qualities and prices for the health care innovations; and third,
consumption choices are made by consumers or patients.
Our paper is related more closely to Acharyya (2002), which examines how
dierent income distributions can produce dierent quality choices by a monop-
olist and shows that an income redistribution that reduces income inequality can
produce either higher or lower optimal quality of a consumption good. More
speciÞcally, when the marginal consumers income is below the income around
which a redistribution from the richer to the poorer consumers takes place, the
optimal quality will increase. However, if the marginal consumers income is
above the income around which redistribution takes place, there can be a de-
crease in the optimal quality. The interpretation of income redistribution is
that of a mechanism that makes an initially uneven income distribution closer
to a uniform income distribution, keeping the same maximum and minimum
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incomes. Our paper uses a simpler income redistribution mechanism in which
income transfers from the rich to the poor within a uniform income distribution
decreases the income variance. This is an attempt to mimic a Health Fund
in which all countries would participate, either as donors or recipients.
However, the purposes of the present paper and that of Acharyya (2002) are
altogether dierent. The latter was primarily concerned with demonstrating
how a monopolist can discriminate between income-constrained consumers who
have identical taste or, more importantly, identical marginal willingness-to-pay,
and the role of income distribution pattern in such a context. Our concern in
this paper is to examine non-altruistic motive of countries in participating in an
international transfer scheme that provides low-income countries with access to
health care innovation1 . We show that even some net donors have utility gains
as a result of the cash transfer, as long as production costs are not too high.
Hence, besides altruism, a self-interest motive is identiÞed for donations from
the higher to the lower income countries.
A possibly controversial assumption in our paper is that price discrimination
is not possible. If price discrimination were feasible, income transfers of the type
described in our paper would still increase market access to medicines. However,
if perfect price discrimination were possible, the self-interest motive for partic-
ipating in an international transfer system would disappear. Empirical studies
show that pharmaceutical prices do dier across countries. However, these dif-
ferences do not appear to be explained primarily by income-related price dier-
entiation policies (Danzon and Chao, 2000; Scherer and Watal, 2002). Rather,
price dierences reßect dierences in regulatory regimes and the availability of
generic/substitute product competition. Our paper focuses on drug innovations
for which there is still not generic competitor. Also, in a recent empirical study,
Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005) conclude that price spillovers, due to paral-
lel trade and reference price control regimes, negatively aect launch of new
drugs. They show that countries that have lower expected prices tend to have
fewer products launched and experience longer delays for those products that
are launched, after controlling for per capita income.
In addition, there are two reasons why price dierences for drug innovations
may decrease in the future. The Þrst reason is that, increasingly, countries are
adopting reference price control regimes. Second, the application of inter-
national trade law on intellectual property rights is likely to reduce dierences
in pharmaceutical prices between rich and poor countries. Our model assumes
that only the innovative Þrm can produce the higher quality medicine through
patent protection. Many developing countries have traditionally excluded phar-
maceutical products from their Patent Law. Most developed countries Patent
1Thus, the present paper is related to Acharyya (2002) only insofar as the result that a
redistribution of income may change the quality of innovation in either direction depending
on the income class around which the income is redistributed. Here, this result constitutes
only the basis of self-interest motives of the consumers and countries in deciding about par-
ticipation in an international income redistribution scheme. This participation decision and
the implementation of the transfer scheme constitute the value additions of the present paper
and points of departure from the earlier analyses.
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Laws state that parallel imports of patented imports are allowed as long as the
patentee has consented to the manufacture or sale of the product elsewhere2 .
Therefore, if a pharmaceutical Þrm is forced to licence its product in a third
country, it would be protected from parallel trade and therefore a price dierence
could be sustained. This explains low prices for pharmaceuticals in some de-
veloping countries with production capabilities where patent laws on medicines
are not respected. India is the main example. This, however, is likely to change
in the near future as more countries comply with the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement (signed in 1994), which stip-
ulates that all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) must grant
patent protection to all new, patentable pharmaceutical innovations3 .
We can, therefore, conclude that even though there might be some level of
income based international price discrimination for innovations, this is very un-
likely to be perfect. Thus, our assumption of uniform pricing is a reasonable
representation of the present and future international markets for drug inno-
vations. As already indicated, our result regarding the donors willingness to
participate in an international transfer system would still hold, though would
be weakened, in an imperfect price discrimination environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the assump-
tions and the structure of the model. In Section 3 we provide a solution for
the pre-transfer choice of medical care and innovation. Section 4 analyzes the
eects of an income transfer on the Þrm behavior and the consumer utility. In
Section 5 we discuss some of the caveats in our analysis. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
Consider a three stage game as follows. In the Þrst stage, all countries or govern-
ments, donors as well as recipients, simultaneously decide about participating
in a redistribution or transfer scheme deÞned below. In the second stage, a sin-
gle innovating Þrm chooses the quality and the price of health care innovation.
Consumption decisions are made in the Þnal stage.
Whereas the private agents, the monopoly provider of health care and the
consumers of health care, maximize their respective payo functions deÞned
later, the national governments are assumed to act in the best interest of their
respective consuming population. That is, decisions of the respective govern-
ments to participate in the international transfer scheme reßect collective deci-
sions of their consuming population4 .
2See europa.eu.int for a detailed explanation of the European law
3Developing countries have 2005 as a deadline for implementing TRIPS. Watal (2000) shows
that the predicted result of the application of the TRIPS agreement in India is a signiÞcant
increase in pharmaceutical prices, which have been amongst the lowest in the world. Indeed,
parallel trade is one of the ways in which India is planning to compensate for some of the
expected price increases.
4We are implicitly assuming that governments are neither corrupt nor inept. However, as
Easterly (2001) indicates, for many developing countries this is not a realistic assumption.
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As a simpliÞcation of analysis, we assume away intra-country income dis-
parity and size dierences across countries. But there are cross-country income
dierences. More precisely, we assume that the world population (or total num-




q for 0 ? d  |  e=
0 otherwise.
where q (e d) is the total number of individuals in the world. There are more
than one way to interpret this distribution function. One interpretation is that
countries are arranged according to their per capita income | 5 [d> e]. Thus, on
this interpretation, countries dier not in size (each having a population size q),
but in respect of per capita income. These are obviously strong assumptions and
are made simply for the purpose of tractability. However, as will be discussed
later, having a non uniform world income distribution (or dierent country sizes
as a matter of fact) would not change our results qualitatively.
What is immediate from such an assumption of identical consumers in each
country is that an income transfer by a representative consumer belonging to the
country with per capita income | will imply income transfers by that country
as well. This is because, if a representative consumer in the country with per
capita income | supports the redistribution scheme, so does any other (and
all) consumer in that country. In other words, the individual decision is the
collective (or national governments) decision.
Consider now the following income transfer scheme. Each consumer, regard-
less of his or her income level, or of the country of residence, will have to con-
tribute a proportion of income to a global fund and receive a lump-sum transfer
which is just equal to the per capita aggregate contribution to the fund. Thus, in
this scheme, transfers are not unilateral. By adopting such an approach where
all individuals (and countries) contribute to the fund and receive transfers, we
can avoid pre-determined and arbitrary segmentation of the world income (or
countries) as pure donors and recipients. In our scheme, however, individuals
and countries can be identiÞed as net donors and net recipients.
Each consumer with income | decides about participating in this transfer
scheme and, on the above set of assumptions, the decision of a country (or its
government) is the same. Pure altruism on part of representative consumers
may motivate such decisions, but we abstract from such a motive. We focus
on the self-interest motives whereby the individual participation decisions are
based on gains through the impact of such a redistribution scheme on health
care innovation and its price.
The best scenario is of course that where all participants and countries, net
donors as well as net recipients, gain. But, as we will show, depending on the
probability of illness and the level of income, some individuals may lose. Thus
not all governments, given an option, will be willing to participate in the trans-
fer scheme. In such a case, the transfer scheme deÞned above is implemented
Our paper therefore deals with an ideal world of honest and competent governments.
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through majority voting5 . Of course, even then the enforcement of the trans-
fer scheme cannot be assured. Our purpose here, however, is not to design an
enforcement mechanism but to show whether majority of countries can support
the scheme based on their selÞsh pursuits of national welfare improvement. Ac-
cordingly, we set aside the enforcement issue by ruling out unilateral defection
as an option. Participation in the transfer scheme is assumed to be binding for
all countries if other countries vote that they are obliged to participate6 . In the
rest of the paper, therefore, we examine how much support the above transfer or
redistribution scheme receives for its implementation through majority voting.
We do not endeavour to Þnd out a majority voting equilibrium as in, for
example, Gouveia (1997). Such an equilibrium is deÞned in the public economics
literature as the decision taken by majority voting such that no further majority
voting can prefer an alternative solution. Given the purpose of this paper, it is
su!cient to show that by majority voting a small, inÞnitesimally small in fact,
redistribution may be preferred to no-redistribution (or zero tax and transfer)
scheme. Whether such a small transfer is a majority voting equilibrium, or
whether further redistributions, larger than our small one, may be preferred to
by majority voting, is altogether a dierent issue, which we leave open in this
paper.
We now proceed to characterize our model formally and analyze whether the
above deÞned transfer may be preferred to no-transfer through majority voting.
2.1 Consumer preferences and health technology
A representative consumer with income | derives utility from a composite com-
modity, F and health, k. Perfect health is indicated by k = 1. There is an
exogenous probability s that individuals fall ill, which implies a fall in the health
level to kv such that 0  kv ? 1. Patients have the option of buying any of the
available medical treatments, which increases the health level above the illness
level.
Utility is maximized subject to a budget constraint, | = F + f (k), where
f (k) is the cost of achieving health level k in the illness state, kv  k  1.
Expected utility for a consumer with income | can then be written as
HX = (1 s)X (|> 1) + sX (|  f (k) > k) >
For simplicity, we assume log-linear utility separable in consumption and
health. So,
HX = (1 s) ln | + s[ln(|  f (k)) + lnk]=
Note that
5Majority voting may not always portray a real world institution. But this oers a conve-
nient analytical mechanism to identify preferences of countries for a redistribution scheme.
6For example, there might simply be moral obligations on part of countries to adopt the
transfer scheme if enough countries support the scheme.
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PUVF>k =
|  f (k)
k >
and so willingness to pay for health restoration increases with income and tends
to inÞnity as the level of health tends to zero, ruling out corner solutions for
cases in which kv tends to 0.
2.2 Medical Innovation
Assume there is an innovation, perhaps a new pharmaceutical= Prior to the
innovation, there is only one treatment available which raises health from kv
to k¯r. We assume that this treatment is supplied competitively at a price
S = f, where f is the constant marginal production cost. The new treatment
raises health to k¯ A k¯r. We assume the new treatment has the same marginal
production cost as the original treatment but that the innovator must incur an




in order to realize the innovation (I 0 A 0> I 00 A 0).
We assume only one Þrm has the knowledge to develop the innovation. Given
this, the innovation is assumed to be realized with certainty. These assumptions
ensure that we do not have to consider issues of patent races and the common
pool problem of U&G. The innovating Þrm will hold a monopoly position in
the supply of the new medicine for a limited period, while it is under patent.
3 Pre-transfer choice of medical care and inno-
vation
In this section, we analyze the choice of quality level k for innovation by the
single innovator and the choice of medical care by the consumers. The utility
levels attained by the consumers at the pre-transfer equilibrium will thus consti-
tute their reservation payos in deciding about participating in the international
transfer scheme as deÞned above.
In the pre-transfer scenario, we have the following two stage game: in the
Þrst stage, the innovator selects the quality of the innovation, measured by the
health level it generates and the price; in the second stage, patients select the
quality of medical care they want to buy. The solution is found using backward
induction.
3.1 Stage 2: Individuals choose medical care
A patient has three basic options of treatment resulting in three levels of medical
expenditure and providing dierent levels of health:
Qr wuhdwphqw : f (kv) = 0=















prefer no medical care to the
original technology:




Patients with the income level
_|  k¯Sk¯ k¯r 
k¯rf
k¯ k¯r are indierent old and
the new technologies:
ln
¡_|  f¢+ ln k¯r = ln ¡_|  S¢+ ln k¯+,
_| = k¯Sk¯ k¯r 
k¯rf
k¯ k¯r = (2)
Therefore, patients with income higher than
_| will buy the innovation. Also
note that the indierent patients income is increasing in the price and decreasing









¢2 (f S ) ? 0= (4)
3.2 Stage 1: The innovator sets the price and the quality
We now obtain the optimal price and quality of the innovator assuming that
price discrimination is not feasible. Note that the expected number of sales of




= Given this, the proÞt function of the innovator is:









Dierentiating with respect to S and using expressions (2) and (3) we obtain
the following Þrst order condition for price optimization:
S  = f+ 1
2
k¯ k¯r
k¯ (e f) = (6)






k¯2 (e f) A 0= (7)
It can also be easily seen that the equilibrium level of income for the indif-





(e+ f) = (8)
However, this property of the optimal indierent income would not hold if
we relax the assumption of production costs being the same for the old and new
products.
The Þrst order condition for proÞt maximization yields:
CH []






















Using (6) to substitute for S  in the expression for the marginal rate of













which, when evaluated at






































This tells us that proÞt maximization entails the willingness to pay of the
marginal consumer being equal to the marginal cost averaged for all consumers
(see Tirole (1988)).
4 International transfer and participation deci-
sion
Consider now the simultaneous decision of countries in participating in an inter-
national transfer scheme whereby, as we have mentioned earlier, each consumer
will have to pay a proportion of income, w| (0 ? w ? 1) and receive a lump
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sum amount, W , regardless of her income and of the country she represents.
Therefore, the post-transfer income of consumers, |W , will be
|W = | (1 w) + W=
We assume that the lump sum amount W received by each individual is equal




















= Also note that w can be interpreted as a measure of
the strength of the redistribution. If w = 1 there is total redistribution: all
individuals will have the mean income. At the other extreme, w = 0 represents
no redistribution.
As we have mentioned earlier, decision of countries to participate in the
transfer scheme is not unilateral. The transfer scheme is implemented through
majority voting and it is binding for all. That is, if enough countries support this
scheme, others participate in the scheme as well even if they may lose. However,
under the assumptions speciÞed in section 2 above, how many countries would
support the transfer scheme depends on the eect of such a redistribution of
the world income on the consumer utility through changes in prices and quality
of the health care innovation. In the following subsection we Þrst analyze such
eects and then in the subsection thereafter we will examine whether this (small)
redistribution or transfer scheme will be preferred to no-transfer situation by
majority voting.
4.1 Eect of income redistribution on prices, quality and
consumer utility
It is easily noticed that the after redistribution income |W is also uniformly










1 w for 0 ? d
W  |W  eW =
0 otherwise.
where,
dW = d (1 w) + w (e+ d)
2




eW = e (1 w) + w (e+ d)
2
= e w (e d)
2
= (13)
The expected proÞts for the innovator with the transfer are













ProÞt maximization then yields the optimal price after the redistribution as:








Note that the maximum post-redistribution income must be above the mar-
ginal costs of production, eW A f> for proÞts to be positive. Also, since eW ? e>
the transfer will decrease the optimal price for given qualities.







Therefore, the transfer will make the indierent consumers income lower.











e d > (17)
For there to be a need for a transfer to ensure universal access, the minimum
income needs to be smaller than the equilibrium indierent income without the
transfer
w A 0/ e+ f
2
A d=
Also, unless the mean income is above the marginal production costs, uni-
versal access will not be feasible. Our assumption regarding the marginal pro-
duction costs, however, ensures that this will not be the case
w ? 1/ f ? e+ d
2
=
Lemma 1 An increase in the strength of the redistribution, w> has a positive
eect on the amount of potential buyers of the innovation as long as the marginal
production costs are smaller than the mean income.






> with respect to the strength of the redistribution, w
Note that if the production cost is above the mean income, since the redistri-
bution is mean preserving, an increase in w will decrease the number of consumers
who can aord even the production cost of the innovation. Therefore, this will
also lower the number of prospective consumers of the innovation.
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Lemma 2 An increase in the strength of the income redistribution will have a
positive eect on the optimal quality as long as the marginal production costs
are smaller than the lowest income.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above lemma states that redistribution of income increases the optimal
quality as long as dW A f, for which d A f is a su!cient condition. In our model,
this means that if the income around which redistribution takes place is higher
than the equilibrium indierent consumers income, income redistribution will
have a positive impact on the equilibrium quality. However, if dW ? f> an
increase in the strength of the redistributive system will decrease the products
quality. The intuition is as follows. The equilibrium indierent income being
above the mean income indicates that only the richest consumers can aord to
buy the innovation. In this case, a mean preserving redistribution from rich
to poor would decrease the income of the consumers who could aord to buy
the pre-transfer optimal quality. Also, the consumers who receive the transfer
will still not be able to buy the innovation at the given prices. In order to
compensate for the loss of consumers, the Þrm will lower the innovations price
and quality.
This result can be extended to a more general class of income distribution
and redistribution methods. As can be seen in Acharyya (2002), as long as the
indierent income is below the income around which redistribution from higher
to lower incomes takes place, the impact of redistribution on the quality will be
positive.
We now analyze the eect of income redistribution on the utility of individ-
uals. Clearly, individuals who receive income as a result of the redistribution
will have utility gains independently of whether they buy the innovation, buy
the lower quality product or do not buy any health care. Also, some of the low
income consumers who chose not to buy the lower quality treatment, will now
be willing to acquire it. We are then interested in seeing what happens to the
utility of the individuals whose income is reduced through the transfer. As has
already been noted, if the income of the consumer who is indierent between
buying the innovation or the lower quality alternative is below the mean income,
all donors will consume the innovation in case of illness. The following lemma
then speciÞes the impact of redistribution on the utility of consumers should
they become ill.
Lemma 3 The income redistribution will have a positive impact on the utility
of patients who buy the innovation and whose pre-transfer income is lower than
\ , where















is the mean income. By the nature of the transfer, all
individuals with income smaller than the mean income receive a positive net
transfer and all those with income above the mean have to make a positive net
transfer. Since \ is above the mean income, even some of the individuals who
have to make a positive transfer will have utility gains. But at the same time,
since e A \ , not all donors will be made better o by the transfer.
Consider now the case in which the mean income, around which redistrib-
ution takes place, is below the indierent income. In this case, there will be a
group of consumers who have to give up some income without still being willing
to buying the innovation. These consumers will be clearly worse o with our
mean preserving redistribution. In the extreme, if the pre-transfer indierent
















Note that since the marginal consumers income is an increasing function of
production costs and our threshold income is an increasing function of the lowest
income in the distribution, very high production costs relative to the lowest
income will make it impossible for any donor to beneÞt from the redistribution.
4.2 Majority voting
We are now in a position to determine how much support the international
transfer scheme will receive. From the above discussion it follows immediately
that all countries whose representative income is lower than the average income
e+ d
2
, will vote in favor of the redistribution, independently of the probability
of illness. Obviously, these people receive money and so, their utility is higher in
the non-illness state. Also, in the illness state, their utility will be higher since
the impact of redistribution is that of decreasing health prices and increasing
their quality.
Countries with per capita income e A | A \ will oppose the redistribution
scheme. If they do not fall ill they clearly loose money with no positive eect. If
they do fall ill, money is also lost and they are not compensated by the positive
eect in utility though price and quality changes, as shown above.
Finally, the countries with income \ A | A e+ d
2
> will support the redistri-
bution scheme as long as their probability of illness is high enough. If healthy,
they lose money with no gain. But, if ill, the negative impact on the utility
through the money lost is compensated by the positive eect through price
decrease and quality increase.
It is important to note that since


























if the decision over whether or not to redistribute income is taken by only the
donors (who are those with the income levels higher than
e+ d
2
) then, by the
majority voting rule the redistribution or transfer scheme will not receive enough
support. If the decision is taken among all the countries though, enough support
is almost certainly going to be gathered as long as the probability of illness is
high enough as to make the countries with per capita income \ A | A e+ d
2
support the small redistribution.
5 Caveats
In the previous section, we have discussed how an income redistribution could
be an eective tool to increase access to health innovations. We have shown that
even some of the donors would see their utilities increase as a result of income
redistribution. The application of the model to Third World access to health
innovations is not straightforward, though. A few caveats are in order. First, for
our model to be an accurate representation of an inter-country redistribution,
we need to assume that per capita income is a good estimate of the purchasing
power of the majority within each country. This assumption becomes stronger
the greater the intra-country income inequality is. An income transfer designed
to help the poor majority gain access to the health care needs to ensure that
donations do not fall into the hands of the rich minority7 . A second, and related,
problem with the applicability of our model to inter-country redistribution is
our assumption of a uniform distribution of income. It cannot be denied that
world income distribution is not uniform (see Milanovic, 2002). With an uneven
world income distribution, say a few rich and many poor, there would still be
scope for an income redistribution from rich to poor that would beneÞt some
donors as long as the inequality is not too high. But in the case that inequality
is very stark, it would be too expensive for the rich to persuade the innovator
to set a lower price that would grant access to the poor. In this case, altruism
would be the sole motive behind an income transfer8 . The third caveat is that,
in reality, income redistribution across the world is voluntary. Our result is
relevant by showing that some donors can have a self-interested motivation for
voluntary participation in such an initiative. Finally, we have proved that some
of the patients who lose income are better o in welfare terms due to the impact
on the behavior of the innovator. But this is an ex-post utility analysis. From
an ex-ante point of view, this result is weakened if the probability of illness is
not high and our model does not apply to a situation where the probability
of illness diers across countries. For illnesses with a much higher impact in
7 It is the case in many poor countries that rich elites prevent aid from reaching the poor
majority so as to block the creation of a middle class that could press for democracy and
individual rights (see Hillman, 2002).
8A discrete consumer type model like, the one used in the quality choice literature by
Cooper (1984) and Acharyya (1998, 2005), would still produce results similar to the ones
obtained in this paper.
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the poorer than in the richer countries, access to innovations would not be an
issue as Þrms would set prices targeting these countries. It is the case, however,
that for many such illnesses purchasing power in poor countries may not be
enough to encourage Þrms to invest in U&G, which could lead to signiÞcant
innovations. There is then a need for higher income countries to fund research
in this illnesses. However, the motivations for such donations are not captured
by our model9 .
6 Concluding remarks
The access of poorer countries to the innovations in health care is a major con-
cern. The existence of price spillovers constrains price discrimination between
higher and lower income countries. As a result, many poorer countries cannot
aord to buy state-of-the-art medicines.
In this paper, we have studied the impact of an income transfer from the
richer to the poorer consumers on the decisions of the health innovator and the
utility of consumers. We Þnd that whenever income redistribution takes place
around an income above the marginal consumers income, the optimal quality
of the health care innovation will increase. Also, we have proved that income
redistribution will increase the utility of some of the consumers whose income is
reduced through the redistribution, as long as marginal production costs are not
too high relative to the lowest income. This indicates a way in which the donor
countries beneÞt from transfers to the poorer nations and, therefore, it would
encourage potential donors to participate in income transfer systems without
altruistic considerations.
A few caveats to our results have been pointed out. The use of a uniform
income distribution function is a simplifying assumption. There is still scope for
an increase in the utility of donors as long as the income distribution is not too
uneven. A self-interested donation is also less likely to arise if the preference for
health products or the probability of illness is small. Our model does not allow
for dierences in the probability of illness across countries.
Finally, we emphasize that income transfers are by no means the only method
available to increase access to health innovations. The WTO is trying to im-
plement agreements that would help developing nations to ensure some limited
access to medicines in the post-TRIPS Agreement era (see http://www.wto.org
for a discussion of the di!culties involved in implementing eective price dis-
crimination and an update on the latest agreements and their implementation).
At the same time, developing countries that are producers of pharmaceutical
products have been looking for alternative methods to avoid predicted price
increases in their medicines as they implement the TRIPS Agreement, parallel
imports being one of the options.




Proof of Lemma 2. >From equation (14), we can derive the First Order


















































which, assuming the usual concavity of the proÞt function for an interior solution
for quality, is positive if
C2H [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Proof of Lemma 3. In order to prove this lemma we dierentiate the
utility of the individual in case of illness with respect to the strength of the
transfer an we evaluate at w = 0. In this manner, we ensure that we are following
































































The second term of the above expression is the eect on utility of a variation in
quality induced by the transfer system. Note that the term in brackets within














































Therefore, the sign of the overall eect is given by the sign of the Þrst term
which represents the eect on utility of an increase in net income induced by
the transfer for given qualities. For this term to be positive, we must have
| ? \ .
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